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Custom, General Principles




Major advances in international criminal law and procedure rose on the trusses of
judicially elucidated sources of international law - custom and general principles.
These sources depend on the crucial art of derivation advanced by the architect of
modern international criminal justice, President Antonio Cassese. What has trans-
formed international criminal justice into flourishing law able to address changing
configurations of violence is the development of the art of finding law in the dark
and wilds of murky unwritten norms. President Cassese pioneered paths through a
perilous bog. '[Tihe law lives in persons,'and to understand the law one must study
the vision of the persons who animate the law, another great scholar and judge
wrote. In that spirit, this article explores advances in the art of elucidating custom
and general principles in international criminal justice through the lens of
President Cassese's legacies and views on legality, sovereignty and the imperatives
of humanity. The result are major landmarks in the prosecution of international
crimes, such as developing protections in armed conflict and against sexual violence
- and also progress in developing defenses and protections for the accused. The art-
icle distills lessons to guide the elucidation of customary international law and gen-
eral principles from national systems and to regulate the transposition of concepts
from national criminal law into international criminal law.
1. Introduction
A. Construing and Constructing International Criminal Law for Evolving
Challenges
Advances in international criminal law such as developing protections backed
by criminal sanctions during armed conflict and bringing sexual violence out
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of the margins of international law are oft and justly celebrated.' Less-heralded
is the major development that made possible the progress during international
criminal justice's astonishing growth spurt. What has transformed interna-
tional criminal justice into flourishing law capable of meeting modern chal-
lenges is the evolution of the art of finding international criminal by
elucidating custom and general principles. President Antonio Cassese blazed
and lit the way, developing the techniques of finding law using these potent
sources through the perilous dark and wilds of political contestation and
murky norms.
The renaissance of international criminal justice that began with the launch
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also
revived custom and general principles as sources of law.2 These judicially eluci-
dated sources of unwritten international law enable adjudication to keep up
with changing configurations of violence that far outpace the slow codification
of international criminal law.3 Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) recognizes both 'international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted by law' and 'general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations' as sources of international law.4 In practice, however, exten-
sive treaty practice often obviated the need to divine general principles and
custom until the launch of modern international criminal justice - a newer
field with a paucity of treaty rules and rapidly evolving challenges.5
1 See e.g. T. Meron,'Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals', 100
American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (2006) 551, at 567; G.K. McDonald, 'Problems,
Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ)
(2004) 558, at 568 and note 53; PM. Wald, 'ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal from
Within', 2 JICJ (2004) 466, at 471-472; S.D. Murphy, 'Progress and Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia!, 93 AJIL (1999) 95. For victims'
views about achievements in recognizing the harms of sexual violence, see D.E Orentlicher,
That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Institute,
2010), at 17-18, 71-72.
2 See A. Cassese, 'The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to the Ascertainment of General Principles of Law Recognized by the Community
of Nations, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds), International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in
Memory of Li Haopei (Routledge, 2001) 43, at 45-46; Wald, supra note 1, at 471.
3 For a view of law as the process of ascertaining changing normative foundations and discussion
of the dynamism permitted by general principles see A.C. Voigt,'The Role of General Principles
in International Law and their Relationship to Treaty Law', 31 Retfterd Argang (2008) 3, at 4,
10-11.
4 Art. 38 ICJSt. While the ICI Statute refers to general principles 'recognized by civilized nations'
today, 'all Member-States of the United Nations are presumed to be civilized nations'. M.C.
Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General Principles of International Law"', 11 Michigan
Journal of International Law (1989-1990), 768, at 783-784. See also B. Cheng, General Principles
of Law As Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Grotius Publications, 1987), at 25 (ex-
plaining the adjective 'civilized' was meant to exclude the 'law of primitive communities which
were not yet civilised' but now 'must be considered as merely redundant, since any State
which is a member of the international society must be considered as civilized.).
5 See e.g. Cassese, supra note 2, at 46; FO. Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), at 8-16, 71-74; T. Meron,
'Revival of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 99 AJIL (2005) 817, at 817, 821-832.
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The very dynamism enabled by the vigorous revival of custom and general
principles has drawn criticism, however. Critics claim that judges have used
the cover of custom and general principles to pursue preferences for how the
law ought to be rather than is, to the detriment of the accused and the legality
principle expressed in the maxim nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without pre-
existing law).6 Indeed, despite the ICJ Statute's inclusion of custom as a source
law, during the framing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC Statute) there was serious consideration of precluding customary
international law as a source for identifying crimes.7 Fueling the debate on ju-
dicially derived sources are competing worldviews about (1) whether the
domestic-law version of legality fits in the international context, (2) how to bal-
ance the interests of individual accused with the community's interest in
accountability, and (3) whether the imperatives of humanity should temper
the strong solicitude for state consent embedded in demands for written codifi-
cation or strong proof of state usage.
These competing worldviews and the debate over the use of judicially
derived sources remain important as international criminal justice continues
to forge forward in meeting the challenges of evolving conflicts and modes of
violence. Indeed, Article 21 of the ICC Statute provides that 'principles and
rules of international law, including the established principles of the interna-
tional law of armed conflict' are secondary sources of applicable law.8
'[G]eneral principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal
systems of the world' - the modern version of the ICJ Statute's 'general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations' - also remain a guide to finding
and forging law, albeit officially designated a subsidiary source.9
This article explores advances in the art of elucidating custom and general
principles through the lens of President Cassese's legacy and views on legality,
sovereignty and the imperatives of humanity. Another great scholar and
jurist, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr, wrote that the law lives in persons and to
understand the law, one must study 'the persons in whose minds and in
whose interaction the rules have lived. 10 To understand the course of interna-
tional criminal law and its future, one must understand the influences of its
major modern architect and intellectual father, President Cassese. He led inter-
national criminal justice through landmark developments in the prosecution
of international crimes - and also in the development of defences and protec-
tions for the accused. The article terms his bold approach to finding and for-
ging international criminal law from custom and general principles visionary
6 V-D. Degan is a particularly vehement critic in this vein. V-D. Degan, 'On the Sources of
International Criminal Law, 4 Chinese Journal of International Law (2005) 45, at 47-48, 75-76,
78.
7 S. Lamb, 'Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law, in A. Cassese,
P. Gaeta and J. R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome. Statute of the International Criminal Court:
A Commentary Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2004) 733, at 749 and note 63.
8 Art. 21 ICCSt.
9 Ibid.
10 J.T. Noonan, Jr, Persons and the Masks of the Law (University of California Press, 1976), at 4, 6.
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legal construction. While controversial, his method of bold and creative inter-
pretation of international criminal law laid a crucial foundation for interna-
tional criminal justice's advances.
The article proceeds in three parts. Section 1 frames the article by explaining
the need to gap-fill in international criminal law. The analysis explores how
competing visions about how legality should be adapted in the international
context and the evolving interest of humanity over sovereignty inform
approaches to finding and forging law. Section 2 explores the important role of
custom and general principles in decisions involving President Cassese with
enduring import for current and future international criminal cases. The dis-
cussion covers landmarks in the prosecution of international crimes, including
protections in armed conflict in an era where the distinction between internal
and international conflict blurs; liability among multiple actors for mass atroci-
ties; and rape and other forms of sexualized violence as the predicate of interna-
tional crimes. The discussion also covers the development of defences and
protections for the accused, including the defence of duress to killings and the
rights of the accused to communicate freely and confidentially with counsel.
Section 3 concludes by distilling important lessons from President Cassese's
body of work about the use of custom and general principles as sources of law
and the transposition of concepts from national criminal law into international
criminal law. This part also discusses the enduring import of his visionary inter-
pretation approach today. International criminal has advanced to more law-like
codification to guide future cases. But the challenges and open questions posed
by changing configurations of conflict and violence still require the courage
and discipline of visionary interpretation that President Cassese pioneered.
B. Gap-Filling and the Visionary Architect of Modern International
Criminal Law
President Cassese is oft-described as 'the chief architect of modern interna-
tional criminal justice'.11 The builder metaphor is apt. In international criminal
law, particularly at its modern jumpstart with the founding of the ICTY,
judges had to build in a very primal way. Jurists had to forage for the very ma-
terials - evidence of unwritten customary rules or general principles -
from which to construe and construct law.12 A nascent branch of international
law, international criminal law had vast gaps between readily discernible law
and the aspiration of accountability. 3 Unlike in mature domestic systems,
11 M. Simons, Antonio Cassese, War Crimes Law Expert, Dies at 74, New York Times, 24 October
2011, at All.
12 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press. 2008), at 4-5 (explaining
the rudimentary nature of international criminal law and how judges must frequently search
for custom and general principles).
13 See e.g. M. Shahabuddeen, 'Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise, in S. Darcy and
J. Powderly (eds), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University
Press, 2010) 184, at 187 (discussing gaps).
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international criminal law is not delineated by standing legislatures with a
shared legal culture and centuries of application. And unlike legislators with
incentives to develop criminal laws to secure the safety of the people and
state, the states and leaders of the international system have difficulty agreeing
on the content of prohibitions that might bind their power.1 4 As a result, inter-
national criminal justice is afflicted with a relative paucity of the primary writ-
ten sources of international law and must fill gaps with the transposition of
relevant aspects of national law that have passed into custom or supply general
principles.'5
These profound gaps in law in the face of powerful human need seized
President Cassese's great intellect. He related in a 2009 interview that he was
drawn to work in these 'areas where the legal network thins and is full of
holes, and therefore the observer may better grasp the power relations that
exist between the primary actors on the international scene: the sovereign
states'. '6 He was moved by the old Roman maxim'hominum causa omne jus con-
stitutum est (any rule of law is ultimately made on account of human
beings)'.1 7 In a brilliant legal architect's hands, custom and general principles
became powerful trusses to build international criminal law from rudiments
and aspirations.
Yet the reliance on such malleable judicially derived sources is vulnerable to
critiques of conflation of the ought with the is and judicial legislation rather
than interpretation. 8 Critics contend that judicial derivation of custom and
general principles is merely a thin disguise for running roughshod over the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) in the drive to trans-
form desired law into governing law.19 Because rigorous methodology is the re-
buttal to such accusations, critics also challenge the methodology for deriving
customary international law and general principles.20 The critiques are a vari-
ant of the longstanding accusation that international criminal justice is the
fiat of power rather than law and merely pursues the desires of the mighty in
violation of the principle of legality.21
14 This tension has, for example, resulted in the rather remarkable inability to define the crime of
aggression for purposes of the vesting of jurisdiction conferred by the Rome Statute until re-
cently at the Kampala conference. For an overview, see C. Kre8 and L. von Holtzendorff, 'The
Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression', 8 JICJ (2010) 1179, at 1110-1209.
15 A. Cassese et al., International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (Oxford University Press,
2011), at 2-3.
16 H. Verrijn Stuart and M. Simons, The Prosecutor and the Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio
Cassese (Amsterdam University Press, 2009), at 154.
17 Ibid.
18 See e.g. T. Meron, 'The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AJIL (1987) 348, at 361;
M. Swart, 'Judicial Lawmaking at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of Sources of
International Law and Adventurous Interpretation, 70 Za6iRV (2010) 459, at 475, 478-480, 485.
19 See e.g. Degan, supra note 6, at 51-52, 75-76, 78.
20 See e.g. ibid. at 75-78 (critiquing reliance on judicial opinions); G. Mettraux, 'The
Internationalization of Domestic Jurisdictions by International Tribunals', 7 JICJ (2009) 911, at
924-925 (critiquing 'modest documentation').
21 For the classic vociferous accusation see Separate Opinion of Radhabinod Pal, United States v.
Araki, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 12 November 1948, at 37, 61-64.
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Concerns over legality and legitimacy led the United Nations (UN)
Secretary-General to specify that the judges of the new ICTY were limited to
applying 'rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any
doubt part of customary law'.22 If strictly construed, such a task would have
put the judges in an impossible position - adjudicate individual criminal li-
ability based only on clear customary law though clear customary interna-
tional law is hardly existent. Non liquet and the failure of the fledgling
endeavour loomed. The unintended result of such rigid constraints may have
been to impel judges to frame their decisions as customary international law
- and thus establish more enduring law beyond the case or context of the ad
hoc tribunal.23 The judges who rose to this impossible task launched a wildly
successful movement, if measured by the flourishing of subsequent interna-
tional criminal justice efforts and praise for the enlarging corpus juris on inter-
national humanitarian law among other substantive legal developments.
Yet the pioneers - President Cassese chief among them - also took much
flak. President Cassese later recalled learning that the draftsmen of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court feared the "'Cassese approach",
namely judges overdoing it, becoming dangerous by, say, producing judgments
that can be innovative'.24 Unlike the spare ICTY Statute, which only granted
jurisdiction over headings of crimes without specifying fundamental elements,
the ICC Statute is a much more detailed code, supplemented by the
Preparatory Commission's Elements of Crimes. The ICC Statute defines the de-
tails of crimes - and even pins down several policies designated 'general prin-
ciples of criminal law' such as modes of liability, how to construe mens rea,
legality and offshoot limitations including nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena
sine lege, non-retroactivity ratione personae and defences. 25
While detailed specification is done under the banner of the nullum crimen
sine lege interest of the accused, President Cassese worried that binding judges
in a detailed code served the interests of states in controlling international
criminal justice. 26 He observed that for the grave crimes adjudicated by
22 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, at § 34.
23 M. Swart suggests the Secretary-General's particularly tight constraint on the ICTY may have
contributed to more of what she terms 'lawmaking' and 'adventurous interpretation' by ICTY
judges. Swart, supra note 18, at 461.
24 Quoted in Verrijn Stuart and Simons, supra note 16, at 52-53.
25 Arts 6-9, 22-34, ICCSt. For analysis of the provisions see K. Ambos, 'General Principles of
Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 Criminal Law Forum (1999) 1. For a contrast of these art-
icles with the earlier conceptions of general principles at Nuremberg see H.-H. Jescheck, 'The
General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, As Mirrored in the
ICC Statute, 2 JICJ (2004) 38, at 40-48.
26 One hears President Cassese's voice in the analysis of the Editorial Board of the Oxford
Commentary to the Rome Statute in expressing concern that the elaborate specification of
crimes and elements may be too detailed, 'symptomatic of States' concern to control the Court
and its judges'. The Board of Editors, 'The Rome Statute: A Tentative Assessment, in Cassese,
Gaeta and Jones (eds), supra note 7, 1901, at 1905. He worried this risking undermining the
Court's work 'by unduly implicating States in the Court's rule-making and jurisprudence'. Ibid.
Custom, General Principles and the Great Architect Cassese 1069
international courts defendants are hardly lacking notice about the criminality
of their conduct. 27 He was concerned that detailed specification by states
would constrain effective judicial inquiry into evolving configurations of vio-
lence that take shelter in blind or blurry zones in the rules.28
At the core of the debates are competing visions of what legality should
mean in the international context and how strongly state interests should be
privileged in the adjudication of human suffering. President Cassese was quite
open about his views on legality. In his leading treatise, he took pains to distin-
guish between legality in national systems versus the international system.29
Within national systems, he distinguished between legal cultures embracing
a vision of substantive justice and strict legality Cultures with criminal laws
founded on substantive justice privileged society over the individual and pun-
ishing wrongdoers regardless of whether the law at the time of the conduct
defined the crime. The vast majority of democracies today embracing strict le-
gality adopted what Franz von Liszt called 'the criminal's magna chartd guaran-
teeing the individual's right to be punished only in accord with requirements
specified in advance by law.30 President Cassese underscored that the trans-
position of legality and its corollary protections such as specificity into interna-
tional law is qualified because of different circumstances, including lack of a
legislature and many open-textured and unwritten rules in need of adaptation
to social challenges.31
To contend legality has crystallized as a principle of customary international
criminal law is just the start of the conversation. It matters which conception
of the competing visions has crystallized. In the international scene, there is
a debate between two worldviews: between (1) those who would transpose
strict legality and its particulars from mature national systems straight into
international law - sometimes dubbed in shorthand the 'national criminal
lawyers',32 and (2) those who believe that legality must be adapted to the reali-
ties of the international context and point out that perpetrators of the kinds
of grave crimes adjudicated internationally are amply aware of their criminal-
ity, sometimes dubbed in shorthand the 'international lawyers'.'33 Moving from
the frame of individual interests to state interests, President Cassese was open
27 See ibid. ('The crimes to be adjudicated by the ICC are "the most serious crimes of international
concern" (Article 1 of the Statute) comprising acts that are (usually) manifestly illegal.
Everyone knows what a murder is, what a rape is, what wanton destruction and genocide are.')
28 For a discussion of gamesmanship around the rules posed by conduct such as extraordinary
rendition designated as deportation for cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by foreign
proxies, see e.g. M.D. Fan,'The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma' 44 UC Davis Law Review (2011)
1407, at 1453-1458, 1470-1471, 1473.
29 Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at 36.
30 Ibid. at 36,40 (quoting F. von Liszt,'Die deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe, 13 Zeitschrift
far die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1893) 325, at 357).
31 Ibid., at 41-52.
32 See A. Pellet, Applicable Law, in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (eds), supra note 7, 1051, at 1057.
33 President Cassese described the cleavage in views between the national criminal lawyers and
international criminal lawyers in a 2009 interview. For more, see the interview in Verrijn
Stuart and Simons, supra note 16, at 65-66.
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about his deep conviction that any rule of law is ultimately made on account of
human beings.34  In his first landmark judicial decision in the Tadi6
Interlocutory Appeal, to which he devoted much labour, President Cassese ex-
plained that the sovereignty of states did not eclipse either the protection of vic-
tims in nominally internal armed conflict or the ability of an individual
accused to mount a plea of the violation of state sovereignty.35 The decision re-
jected the rule that individual accused 'have no standing to challenge viola-
tions of international treaties in the absence of a protest by a sovereign
involved'.36 President Cassese explained the notion was a throwback to the
times of sacrosanct and unassailable sovereignty that 'recently has suffered
progressive erosion at the hands of the more liberal forces at work in the demo-
cratic societies, particularly in the field of human rights'37 He also held that
the old distinction curtailing protections in internal conflict in deference to
state sovereignty is eroding, in part because'[a] State-sovereignty-oriented ap-
proach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach'.
The decision was bold, rendered by a visionary shaped by his times. Without
judicial creativity, changing configurations of violence and conflict would
evade redress in the gaping dark of international criminal law's interstices.
The fledgling effort at international criminal justice would have been mired in
the paralyzing murk. Surmounting the challenge, President Cassese deployed
dynamic interpretation, construing the law in light of background principles,
including changing human rights commitments. The approach is vulnerable
to critiques of transgression of what President Cassese would term strict legal-
ity.39 But President Cassese forthrightly championed the idea that legality
must be adapted to the pragmatic realities of the international context.
The needs of international criminal justice can change in part because of the
maturation of law enabled by the jump-start of visionary interpretation. The
Rome Statute is more code-like in specifying crimes in advance, thereby per-
mitting stronger protections against retroactive application of law and other
corollaries of legality principle. The ambit and need for judicial creativity is
thus narrowed. Yet President Cassese's insights about interpretation remain im-
portant in the post-Rome Statute world. No code can cover everything and judi-
cial interpretation and gap-filling remain necessary. As experts assessing the
34 Ibid., at 154; Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction. Tadid
(ICTY-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, § 97 (hereafter 'Tadid Interlocutory Appeal
Decision').
35 Tadid Interlocutory Appeal Decision, §§ 55, 97.
36 Ibid. at § 55 (quoting United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990)).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., § 97.
39 See e.g. C. Kreg, 'Nulla Poena, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege', Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (2010), § 17 ('There can be no doubt, however, that the manner in which
customary international criminal law was discerned and held to exist made the Tadid Case a
creative precedent susceptible to criticism under a strictly construed principle of
non-retroactivity').
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ICC Statute observe, much more work needs to be done, especially in develop-
ing the general parts of crimes such as modes of liability, mens rea standards
and defences. 4 0 The ICC Statute recognizes this by retaining 'principles and
rules of international law, including the established principles of the interna-
tional law of armed conflict' and 'general principles of law derived by the
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world' as applicable law.4 1
President Cassese was at once an architect of his times - pioneering the
launch of international criminal justice - and an architect for the future of
international criminal law. His body of work leaves many lessons on the art of
elucidating customary international law and general principles to help guide
the future of international criminal law.
2. The Art of Elucidating Customary International Law
and General Principles
A. Deriving Customary International Law
The discipline of elucidating customary international criminal law was in dis-
array when President Cassese took the helm of the first international criminal
justice endeavour since the World War II era tribunals. True, the ICJ Statute
long had listed custom as a source of law.4 2 But the theory and practice of elu-
cidating custom was under siege. Commentators debated everything from the
amorphousness and circular illogic of requiring opinio juris - state compli-
ance out of the belief a principle is law - for the principle to be law, to the dif-
ficulties of amassing evidence of widespread state practice and opinio juris, to
whether customary international law has any influence at all on state behav-
iour.4 3 Moreover, the ICJ's 1984 ruling in Nicaragua v. United States4 4 and subse-
quent decisions left international experts dismayed at the state of the
discipline of discerning customary international law.45
40 See e.g. G.P. Fletcher,'Parochial versus Universal Criminal Law, 3 JICJ (2005) 20, at 33 (discuss-
ing how 'international criminal law desperately needs serious work on why and when intention
should be required and, even more acutely, on the meaning of intentionality and recklessness');
F. Mantovani, 'The General Principles of International Criminal Law: The Viewpoint of a
National Criminal Lawyer, 1 JICJ (2003) 26, at 26-27, 31-36 (discussing underdevelopment of
the general part of international crimes).
41 Art. 21 ICCSt.
42 Art. 38(1)(b) ICCSt.
43 See e.g. A.A. DAmato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press, 1971),
at 6. See also A.T. Guzman, 'Saving Customary International Law', 27 Michigan Journal of
International Law (2005) 115, at 124-131 (collecting and responding to critiques); J. Goldsmith
and E. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005), at 43-45 (exposing the fiction of custom-
ary international law's basic assumptions).
44 Judgment, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, ICJ
Reports, 27 June 1986, at 14.
45 See e.g. A.A. DAmato, 'Trashing Customary International Law', 81 AJIL (1987) 101, at 103;
Meron, supra note 5, at 820.
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The ICJ in Nicaragua considered the liability of the United States for arming,
training, financing and otherwise supporting the rebel contras in their attempt
to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The ICJ found the United States
breached a customary international law obligation of non-interference in the
internal affairs of another state. The ICJ declined, however, to hold the United
States liable for international humanitarian law violations by the contras hold-
ing that effective control over the contras in their operations was required for li-
ability. Beyond the substantive outcomes, international law experts expressed
consternation at the ICJ's method for declaring customary international law
'without even considering the practice of states and without giving any inde-
pendent, ascertainable meaning to the concept of opinio juris'46
The Nicaragua decision also roused President Cassese's concern because of
the pronouncement of rules limiting liability without explicating from
whence they come at all. Commenting on the ICJ's 'effective control' test,
President Cassese wrote:
The 'effective control' test may or may not be persuasive. What matters, however, is to estab-
lish whether it is based on either customary law (resulting from state practice, case law
and opinio juris) or, absent any specific rule of customary law, on general principles on
state responsibility or even general principles of international law. It is, however, a fact
that the Court in Nicaragua set out that test without explaining or clarifying the grounds
on which it was based. No reference is made by the Court either to state practice or to
other authorities. This is in keeping with a regrettable recent tendency of the Court not to
corroborate its pronouncements on international customary rules (other than those trad-
itional rules that are largely upheld in case law and the legal literature) with a showing, if
only concise, of the relevant practice and opinio juris.4 7
President Cassese's contributions to the discipline of elucidating customary
international law are all the more remarkable when assessed against this back-
drop of doubt and disarray.
From the start, President Cassese delivered a bold decision in Tadid giving
international humanitarian law teeth, even within internal armed conflicts.
He ruled that customary international humanitarian law extended an array
of protections in internal conflicts. 48 He also concluded that customary inter-
national law levies criminal liability for serious violations of Common Article
3 to the Geneva Conventions regulating internal armed conflict.49
The decision's approach to elucidating customary international humanitar-
ian law was a significant advance from the scant rationales given by the
World War II-era jurisprudence for declaring customary international law.so
Judge Cassese's opinion canvassed opinio juris and state practice, traversing
46 DAmato, supra note 45, at 103.
47 A. Cassese, 'The Nicaragua Test and the Tadid Test Revisited in Light of the ICJ Decision on
Genocide in Bosnia' 18 European Journal of International Law (2007) 649, at 653-654.
48 Tadid Interlocutory Appeal Decision, §§ 96-136.
49 Ibid., §136.
50 T. Meron, 'The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian
Law', 90 AJIL (1996) 238, at 239.
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internal armed conflicts from Yemen to China to Chechnya to the Congo, El
Salvador and Spain and mining military manuals, UN resolutions, official pro-
nouncements and myriad other sources.51 Then-professor and now-ICTY
President Meron has observed that the decision's focus on statements rather
than actual practice resembled the approach in human rights law where
opinio juris is emphasized to compensate for the paucity of supporting prac-
tice.52 President Cassese explained why: '[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to
pinpoint the actual behaviour of the troops in the field' because of limited
access to the theatre of military operations and even misinformation about
what is happening in the field.s3 He thus forged a more practicable approach.
Ascertaining customary international law can be a toilsome and thankless
task because one can always wish for more evidence. One can always do more
if one had unlimited time and resources to study the world. And because the
whole world is not canvassed (and may not always agree - nor need to uni-
formly agree) one is subject to the accusation of picking and privileging evi-
dence that supports the result one seeks.
Controversial outcomes against the interests of defendants have come under
intense fire. For example, Judge Cassese presided in the Kupreskid judgment,
which refused to recognize a defence to the killing of civilians in combat
zones as legitimate reprisals. Putting heavy weight on evidence of opinio furis
sive necessitatis, Kupreskd held that an absolute rule forbidding reprisals
against civilians in combat zones had crystallized.s4 The decision has drawn
vigorous criticism regarding the derivation of the rule while omitting contrary
practice and declarations.55 Part of the concern is that methodological protec-
tions in derivation and interpretation of customary international law may be
relaxed in the drive to reach a result the judge normatively desires.
Perhaps most controversial of all, President Cassese's derivation of joint crim-
inal enterprise (JCE) doctrine as a matter of customary international law in
the Tadid appeal judgment has sparked a vast literature.56 Substantively, the
most controversial aspect of JCE liability is the third limb that permits
51 Tadi6 Interlocutory Appeal Decision, §§ 105, 102, 117.
52 Meron, supra note 50, at 239-240.
53 Tadi6 Interlocutory Appeal Decision, § 99.
54 Judgment, Kupreskid (IT-95-16), Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, §§ 527-534.
55 C. Greenwood,'Belligerant Reprisals in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia', in H. Fischer, C. Kre8 and S.R. Liider (eds), International and
National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (Arno Spitz,
2001) 546.
56 Judgment, Tadi6 (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, at 185-229. For just a sample of the
vast literature, see e.g. M. Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge University Press,
2009), at 66-78; J.D. Ohlin, 'Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal
Enterprise', 5 JICJ (2007) 69; M. Badar, 'Just Convict Everyone!" Joint Perpetration: From Tadi6
to Stakic and Back Again', 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006) 293; A.M. Danner and
J.S. Martinez, 'Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the
Development of International Criminal Law', 93 California Law Review (2005) 75. For President
Cassese's response to the criticisms, see A. Cassese, 'The Proper Limits of Individual
Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 JICJ (2007) 109.
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conviction for unintended but foreseeable crimes outside the common criminal
purpose akin to Pinkerton liability in American conspiracy law or natural and
probable consequences doctrine at common law.57 Substantive disagreement
also combine with methodological critiques, including the oft-raised concern
about the Tadid court's heavy reliance on judicial decisions stemming from the
World War II era, often in Anglo-American zones of influence. More aggressive
critiques allege that the 'Just Convict Everyone' doctrine, as JCE is sometimes
termed, used the amorphous Rorschach blot of customary law as cover to
ease the path towards conviction by judges with a predilection for the
prosecution.58
Yet President Cassese defied such caricatures. He was a humanist to the
core, for victims and for the accused. President Cassese was a dissenting voice
at the ICTY who argued that the accused should be able to mount a defence
of duress to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity even when
the underlying crimes involve homicide.59 On this controversial question,
President Cassese marshalled a wide array of cases - and relevant law in the
former Yugoslavia - to reject the Prosecutor's argument that customary inter-
national law excludes duress as a defence to killings.60 He argued that where
customary international law does not dictate the answer, the customary prin-
ciple nullum crimen sine lege counsels a ruling in favour of the accused.6 1 In
compassion for the difficult situations faced by people - including the
accused - in armed conflict, President Cassese wrote: 'Law is based on what
society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable
standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom,
and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards.'62
The case involved Drazen Erdemovid, a lance corporal in the Bosnian Serb
Army haunted by guilt over killing between 10 and a 100 Bosnian Muslim
men and boys under threat of death for disobedience of the order to kill.63
President Cassese later recalled:
I was in so many trials, but only once I saw remorse, in Drazen Erdemovi6. He was a young
man who admitted to having killed many Muslims in the Srebrenica area. He cried when
he said. I had refused to take part in the killing, but the commander of the execution
squad threatened me with death if I dropped out. So I had to accept under duress. I went
on killing because I have a wife and a small child.... On that occasion I saw that somebody
57 So-called because of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 US 640 (1946) (recognizing extended liabil-
ity for co-conspirators).
58 In this regard, see e.g. Degan, supra note 19, at 51-52, 75-78.
59 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdemovid (IT-96-22), Appeals Chamber,
7 October 1997, at §§ 16-49.
60 See ibid. at §§ 18-19 (summarizing Prosecutor's claim predicated on asserted customary inter-
national law); ibid., at §§ 20-39, 49 (rebutting claim).
61 Ibid., at § 48.
62 Ibid., at § 47.
63 For background, see e.g. P. Rowe, 'Duress As A Defence to War Crimes After Erdemovid: A
Laboratory for a Permanent Court?, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (1998) 210.
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as human as I am happened to commit a crime because he found himself in the maelstrom
of war.6 4
This deeply human interaction informs our understanding of the heart of the
law. Judge Cassese brought with him the empathy that humanizes the law
and makes it capable of governing through the tumult of history. His vision,
compassion and reasoning may yet inform the interpretation of Article
31(1)(d) of the ICC Statute, which does not on its face exclude duress as a de-
fence to crimes involving killing.
Among President Cassese's last decisions was a strong ruling on the due pro-
cess protections for the defence. This time the president who helped launch
international criminal justice's renaissance was leading one of its newest en-
deavours, the hybrid Special Tribunal for Lebanon. One of the earliest issues
for the President was whether persons detained in Lebanon under the author-
ity of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have the right to enjoy privileged and
confidential meetings with their attorneys. President Cassese held that custom-
ary international law conferred the fundamental right relating to due process
to communicate freely and confidentially with counsel.6 5 The order was brief,
referencing the widespread recognition among states and the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, apparently taking the right as so
well-established that lengthy exegesis was unwarranted. Here, President
Cassese wielded customary international law to develop the robust protections
for the right of the accused to a fair trial that mark the progress of a maturing
international criminal justice system.6 6
B. General Principles
Norms that have not yet passed into customary international law may none-
theless inform interpretation and gap-filling if sufficiently widespread among
national laws to permit derivation as a general principle.67 The launch of con-
temporary international criminal justice powerfully revived general principles
from virtual desuetude as a source of law in the new field where law was
64 Quoted in Verrijn Stuart and Simons, supra note 16, at 87.
65 Order on Conditions of Detention (CH/PRES/2009/01/rev), Before the President of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, 21 April 2009, at §§ 7, 16-18.
66 For an excellent overview of the evolution of how the increasing incorporation of human rights
norms into international criminal procedure have enhanced protections for the accused, see
S. Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2003).
67 See Art. 21(1)(c) ICCSt. (listing general principles as a subsidiary source). Schabas observes that
general principles are often confused with customary international law. W Schabas, The UN
International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge
University Press, 2006), at 102. The two are distinct, however - induction of principles from
social phenomenon common across national systems rather than general state practice accom-
panied by opinio juris are the primary evidence of general principles derived from national sys-
tems, and general principles are a subsidiary rather than secondary source of applicable law
under the ICC Statute. Ibid.
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scarce and guideposts needed. International adjudication of individual rather
than state liability for grave wrongs presents the challenge of filling in the
basic and general parts of crimes, such as modes of liability, mens rea stand-
ards and defences. Judges had to draw from national criminal laws to fill in
the details. This grafting to build a hybrid branch of international law with
concepts from municipal jurisdictions is still in progress.6 9 Judicial induction
of general principles from national laws is an important regulator of the trans-
position of national criminal doctrines.
Two major challenges of applying general principles to gap-fill arise from (1)
differences between the national and international context that require tai-
lored transposition and (2) and differences between national legal cultures.
Judge Cassese cautioned against mechanical transposition of national practices
and called for circumspection and adaptation of principles derived from na-
tional criminal law to harmonize with the international context.70 He also
was a leader in teaching the need to consider a diversity of approaches.
A major challenge in forging international criminal law and procedure is har-
monizing and hybridizing across diverse legal cultures, including the civil and
common law systems.7 In this complex domain, President Cassese also lit the
way. He explained that a principle of national criminal law should only be con-
sidered a general principle 'if a court finds that it is shared by common law
and civil law systems as well as other legal systems such as those of the
Islamic world, some Asian countries such as China and Japan and the African
continent'.72 A disciplined method of induction regulates the transposition of
national criminal law concepts into international criminal law.
President Cassese and general principles greatly enriched an oft-cited major
advance of international criminal justice - defining rape and sexual assault
as predicates of international crimes. President Cassese laid the intellectual
foundations for the recognition of rape as a war crime years at the outset in
the 1995 Tadid jurisdictional appeal. He wrote in Tadid: 'Why protect civilians
from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or [wanton destruction and
other crimes] ... when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain
from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed
violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign State?' 73 He
later recalled critiques of the bold move to argue for the first time that 'rape
in internal armed conflict is as much a war crime as in international conflict'
68 Cassese, supra note 2, at 45-46.
69 Cassese, supra note 15, at 2.
70 See e.g. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdemovd (IT-96-22-A), Appeals
Chamber, 7 October 1997, at §§ 2-5.
71 For insights see O.-G. Kwon, 'The Challenge of An International Criminal Tribunal, As Seen
from the Bench, 5 JlCJ (2007) 360.
72 Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at 22.
73 Tadid Interlocutory Appeal Decision, § 97.
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and facing arguments that 'rape was only regarded as a national offense, so
punishable under Serbian law or Bosnian law, not under international law'.
President Cassese's influence also shaped the definition of rape and sexual
assault as international crimes. While the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda's decision in Akayesu was the first international case to define rape as
a matter of international criminal law, its exceedingly broad and amorphous
definition created without reference to sources proved controversial and
short-lived.75 Akayesu defined rape 'as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive'7 6 It fell to
the ICTY to inject greater rigour in the elucidation of the definition of rape in
international law.
The ICTY's 1998 Furundfija trial court judgment became a more enduring
landmark in the definition of rape and sexual assault in international law.
Part of its influence comes from the injection of greater rigour in the approach
to elucidating a definition. President Cassese was a member of the Furundiija
Chamber and his influence is evident. The trial judgment begins its elucidation
of a definition of rape by explaining that
Whenever international criminal rules do not define a notion of criminal law, reliance upon
national legislation is justified, subject to the following conditions: (i) unless indicated by
an international rule, reference should not be made to one national legal system only, say
that of common-law or that of civil-law States. Rather, international courts must draw
upon the general concepts and legal institutions common to all the major legal systems of
the world. This presupposes a process of identification of the common denominators in
these legal systems so as to pinpoint the basic notions they share; (ii) since 'international
trials exhibit a number of features that differentiate them from national criminal proceed-
ings' account must be taken of the specificity of international criminal proceedings when
utilising national law notions. In this way a mechanical importation or transposition from
national law into international criminal proceedings is avoided, as well as the attendant dis-
tortions of the unique traits of such proceedings.7 7
Note the adoption of President Cassese's caution about resort to national crim-
inal laws and teaching about consulting a diversity of jurisdictions in the
Trial Chamber's decision. Surveying an array of laws traversing such diverse
jurisdictions as Zambia, Pakistan, Chile, China, the Netherlands and of the
course Bosnia, the Furundiija court concluded that 'in spite of inevitable
74 Quoted in Verrijn Stuart and Simons, supra note 16, at 67. In response, Judge Cassese recalled
the famous Martens Clause in the preamble to the 1899 Hague Conventions, which provides
that in cases not covered by the incomplete text of the convention, protected populations
remain 'under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result
from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the re-
quirements of the public conscience'. For background and the continuing vitality and strong in-
fluence of the Martens Clause in the world scene see e.g. T. Meron, 'The Martens Clause,
Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AJIL (2000) 78.
75 For a discussion, see e.g. Swart, supra note 18, at 477-478.
76 Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR- 96-4), Trial Chamber 1, 2 September 1998, at §§ 596-598.
77 Judgment, Furundiija (IT-95-17), Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, at § 178 (adopting Cassese
caution discussed, supra at note 70).
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discrepancies, most legal systems in the common and civil law worlds consider
rape to be the forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or
the forcible insertion of any other object into either the vagina or the anus'.78
More methodologically controversial is Furundfijds approach to analysing
whether forcible penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ consti-
tutes rape, with its full expressive stigma or sexual assault.79 The Trial
Chamber acknowledged the wide divergence of national laws on the question
- including under Bosnian law - but nonetheless held despite the strong
split that forced oral penetration is rape rather than sexual assault.80 The
Chamber clothed the conclusion in language about general respect for human
dignity - but of course, that is hardly determinative of the question and
sweeps too broadly. Respect for dignity is implicated in interpretation of most
international crimes. Indeed Judge Cassese has critiqued the approaches in
Furundiija and pointed to refinements in subsequent cases.81
The appeal of general principles is their ability to transpose relevant national
practices to fill gaps and permit normative development to meet evolving chal-
lenges. President Cassese paved the way while teaching rigour and caution.
Wielded with sensitivity to the nature and needs of the international context,
general principles can be vital to the lifeblood and continued growth of inter-
national criminal law, supplying normative standards to guide where the legal
terrain is unclear.82
3. Conclusion
Changing configurations of modern conflict and mass atrocities will continue
to press on ambiguities and lacunae in the evolving written codes of interna-
tional criminal law. For example, what are the standards governing criminal
responsibility, including superior responsibility, for crimes by privatized forces
such as military contractors or a violent rabble of civilians killing in support
of a governmental authority? Is knowledge the same as intent? What other
mens rea standards regulate modes of liability? President Cassese blazed a
path through the rudiments and murk, clarifying many looming questions
and clearing space for the astonishing growth of international criminal law
- but much work remains to be done.
78 Ibid., at §§ 180-181.
79 Ibid., at §§ 172-183.
80 Ibid., at §§ 183-184.
81 Cassese, supra note 2, at 53.
82 Indeed, President Cassese observes that though formally, it is only after consulting primary and
secondary sources and finding them to no avail that judges can turn to the subsidiary source
of general principles, in practice 'international courts, once they find that no general exists on
a specific issue, turn immediately to the subsidiary source'. Cassese, International Criminal
Law, supra note 12, at 21. The reason is because of the relatively scant availability and assistance
of the higher-ranked sources and the greater likelihood of finding 'a normative standard applic-
able to the case at issue' by exploring the principal criminal systems of the world. Ibid.
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In forging forward, international criminal law would do well to heed
President Cassese's cautions about the transposition of national criminal con-
cepts and follow his courageous example of openly revealing his approaches.
Indeed Presiding Judge Adrian Fulford's illuminating separate opinion in the
ICC's recent and first judgment in Lubanga Dyilo spotlights the need to observe
President Cassese's cautions and courage.83 Judge Fulford wrote separately to
express concern about the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber's importation of German
concepts of co-perpetration into the meaning of liability under Article 25(3)(a)
of the ICC Statute for committing a crime 'jointly with another'.84 Judge
Fulford noted that while general principles of law derived from national legal
systems may inform interpretation, a'Chamber should undertake a careful as-
sessment as to whether the policy considerations underlying the domestic
legal doctrine are applicable at this Court, and it should investigate the doc-
trine's compatibility with the Rome Statute framework'.85
It is heartening to hear echoes of Judge Cassese's wisdom endure. And so
should his courage. It takes courage to show one's work - set forth in the evi-
dence for evaluation - in deriving customary international law or a general
principle rather than merely announcing the conclusion. It takes courage to
justify the adaptation of national criminal law concepts to the international
context - and to explain why certain concepts should not be transposed. It
takes courage to use the disciplines of elucidating customary international
law and general principles to regulate gap-filling and grafting of national crim-
inal law concepts onto criminal law. The present and the future of interna-
tional criminal law and its continued growth owe a great deal to the great
architect's wisdom and courage.
83 Judgment, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, Separate Opinion
of Judge Adrian Fulford.
84 Ibid., at §§ 4, 10-11.
85 Ibid. at § 10.
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